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Abstract
Recently, two distinct notions of pluralism have been put forward in regard to research methods
in economics: (1) model pluralism, stating that economists construct many theoretical models
offering descriptions of actual or possible mechanisms and use different models for different pur-
poses, and (2) evidential pluralism, according to which causal claims are established on the basis
of theoretical conjecture and by observing the operation of a difference-making factor. In this pa-
per, I make a case for methodological pluralism. I argue that economists not only use different
research methods but also interpret their role in causal inference differently — depending on
which (big-M) Methodological school they subscribe to. The argument proceeds by analyzing ex-
amples of recent economic research appealing to different Methodological commitments.
Keywords: causal inference, philosophy of economics, methodological pluralism, evidential plu-
ralism
Dani Rodrik (2015: 8) compares economics to a library of models. On his
view, which can be referred to as model pluralism,1 “the dismal science” pro-
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ceeds by delivering new models rather than rejecting and revising models and
theories as the traditional view of scientific practice would have it (e.g., Blaug
1992). According to model pluralism, the presence of different models of the
same phenomena in scientific discourse is acceptable as long as each model
serves some specific purposes better than its competition. Rodrik’s view on
the modeling practices of economists has raised considerable interest among
philosophers of economics, who focused on refining his views (Mäki 2018),
analyzing how models are selected (Grüne-Yanoff, Marchionni 2018), and
how economists explain with pluralistic models (Aydinonat 2018). However,
the “models” analyzed by the philosophers supporting this view are defined
relatively strictly considering the actual research practices of economics and
focus on axiomatic and mathematically tractable models that share common
presuppositions about rationality and market efficiency. Similarly, Rodrik
(2015), in line with mainstream philosophy of economics, focuses on theo-
retical models and stresses the role of deductive models in economics. The
debate over the pluralism of economic models focuses on theoretical, axiomatic
models of phenomena that constitute only a fraction of contemporary re-
search (cf. Hamermesh 2013 for a review).
François Claveau (2012) and Alessio Moneta and Frederica Russo (2014)
argue for a pluralism of evidence in causal inference in economics. However,
they support pluralism that defines causal claims as such correlations that
can be mechanistically explained and therefore require both a theoretical and
an econometric model. While Claveau (2012) discusses case studies from an
OECD (1994) unemployment report to argue that various sources of evidence
(such as theoretical modeling and empirical evidence for difference-making
factors) support different causal conclusions (i.e., not all types of evidence are
necessary for each causal conclusion), Moneta and Russo (2014) claim that
both mechanistic and difference-making evidence is necessary to justify a causal
claim in economics, just as in health sciences (Russo, Williamson 2007). In
this article, I argue that economists use different research methods (a claim
that is labeled “evidential pluralism”) and construct different models of the
same phenomena (model pluralism) because they are committed to different
Methodological (epistemological) views2 (the claim I label “Methodological
pluralism”). In other words, I contend that mainstream economics is a Meth-
odologically pluralist discipline in the sense that economists are not only plu-
ralist in regard to using different types of evidence and research methods but
                                                   
2 Given the distinction between small-m methodology and big-M methodology
(McCloskey 1998, Boland 2014), I maintain that economists as a group are committed to
(big-M) Methodological pluralism while evidential pluralism could be understood as
(small-m) methodological pluralism.
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also interpret their results and connect different types of evidence in a way
presupposing the views on science accepted by different Methodological
schools in the philosophy of economics (Maziarz 2018b). The article proceeds
by discussing case studies of recent causal economic research published in
the three top economic journals in the 2005-2015 period (Maziarz 2018a)
with a view to reconstructing Methodological commitments and relating them
to debates in the philosophy of economics and the philosophy of science.
In section 1, I introduce and define three types of research methods
(theoretical modeling, econometric modeling, and laboratory experiment)
used by economists in their case studies. In section 2, I analyze Jidong Zhou’s
(2014) study, which uses an axiomatic model as exclusive evidence for a causal
claim, and interpret it as a theoretical conjecture about a possible mechanism.
In section 3, I discuss Björn Bartling’s, Ernst Fehr’s, and Klaus M. Schmidt’s
(2012) research combining a laboratory experiment with theoretical models
as an attempt at providing evidence for the reality of a mechanism fulfilling
the requirement of experimental closure. In section 4, I show that Boyan
Jovanovic and Balàzs Szentes (2013) use a theoretical model with a view to
describing a dataset in a way inspired by Milton Friedman’s (2008 [1953])
instrumentalist methodology. In section 5, I analyze a study by Paul Beaudry,
Mark Doms, and Ethan Lewis (2010), who also use a theoretical and an
econometric model in tandem but interpret it as an example of the confirma-
tionist approach. In section 6, I elaborate on the view that mainstream eco-
nomics is a Methodologically pluralist science. Finally, I summarize the ar-
gument and indicate areas of further research.
1. THE PLURALITY OF RESEARCH METHODS
USED FOR CAUSAL INFERENCE
The research methods used in contemporary economics to provide evidence
for causal claims cover theoretical (axiomatic) models, econometric models es-
timated on observational data, experimental and quasi-experimental research
designs (such as randomized field trials, natural experiments, and simulations),
and case studies. Considering the purpose of the article, which is to argue for
Methodological pluralism, I am going to analyze (a) the way in which economists
use theoretical models, econometric models, and randomized laboratory ex-
periments to justify causal claims and (b) the evidential role played by these re-
search methods. In this section, I develop definitions of these research methods
that are abstractions based on a systematic literature review (Maziarz 2018a).
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Although some authors (e.g., Guala 2005, Moneta, Russo 2014, Hoover
2001, Reiss 2013) discuss other research methods, the most hotly debated re-
search method in mainstream economics is theoretical (axiomatic) modeling.
Theoretical models specify assumptions describing the constraints and pref-
erences of economic agents. These agents are usually faced with a maximiza-
tion problem requiring a choice. Contrary to econometric models estimated
on data (considered below) and axiomatic (deductive) calibrated models,
such models are non-empirical in the sense that there is no empirical input
other than the axioms provided by the modeler. Roger Backhouse (2002:
202) depicts this modeling practice as follows: “[c]reating a theoretical model
involves finding a set of simplifying assumptions such that it is possible to
demonstrate, to generally accepted standards of rigor, that the outcome will
follow from the initial conditions.” Theoretical economic models are highly
formalized models describing the effects of a (usually rational) solution to
a maximization problem faced by agents.
Econometrics is an empirical branch of economics that uses various quan-
titative techniques to process observational data with a view to constructing
models of data. Generally speaking, econometric models are mathematical
functions that relate the values of the right-hand sides of equations (exogenous
variables) to the values of the (endogenous) variables on the left-hand sides.
Econometric models can be represented symbolically as follows:
Y = f(X) + ε
where:
Y — endogenous variable;
X — a vector of exogenous variables;
f( )— a function relating the values of exogenous variables to the values of
endogenous variables;
ε — the error term denoting the difference between the theoretical (cal-
culated) and the actual value of Y.
In contrast to theoretical models that are deductive axiomatic systems,
econometric models are “estimated.” For simplicity, let me consider a linear
regression. This simple kind of econometric model has the following specifi-
cation:
y = a1 ∗ x1 + a2 ∗ x2 + … + an ∗ xn + ε
where:
an — a parameter denoting a partial correlation between xn and y;
xn — n-th exogenous variable.
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The estimation of econometric models is a process employing statistical
methods that “choose” the values of parameters (an) on the basis of data. In
other words, econometric techniques allow us to obtain a mathematical func-
tion relating (with approximation) a set of exogenous variables to a set of en-
dogenous variable(s).
In fact, econometric techniques are also employed to analyze quantita-
tively experimental data (e.g., Andersen et al. 2011, Sacerdote 2007). How-
ever, in the context of causal inference, the use of experimental or quasi-
experimental research designs (e.g., a natural experiment) is a significant
difference that makes for another type of research method. Experimental and
quasi-experimental research in economics can be classified into several cate-
gories. Natural experiments use interventions beyond the control of econo-
mists so as to infer the effects of such interventions (e.g., Burgess, Pande
2005, Jacob, Ludwig 2012). (Actual) experiments result from on-purpose in-
terventions conducted by economists in order to infer the effects of these
difference-making factors. The two basic categories of economic experiments
are field and laboratory experiments. The former use randomization to divide
participants into the experimental and control groups and are conducted in
the “field” (i.e., in an environment beyond the control of an experimenter).
The latter, in addition to randomization, are conducted in an “economic labo-
ratory,” where participants take part in a simulated market or competitive
situation. This makes it possible to isolate the mechanism under investigation
by screening it from the influence of other factors.
Below, I discuss the different ways in which these research methods are
used and combined in economic research so as to argue that these differences
result from different methodological positions accepted by different economists.
2. THEORETICAL MODELING
AS A CONJECTURE ABOUT A POSSIBLE MECHANISM
Scientific realism in the philosophy of economics is formulated differently
from scientific realism in the general philosophy of science. The peculiarity is
the recent acceptance of the pragmatist dimension (i.e., the view that the
purpose of modeling influences representations), which can be clearly ob-
served in the evolution of Uskali Mäki’s views.3 The mainstream position in
                                                   
3 Mäki’s views on the role of theoretical models changed from employing the notion of
isolation and idealization in the early formulations (e.g., 1992, 1994) to accepting the
pragmatist dimension (2009, 2017).
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the philosophy of economics focuses its analyses on theoretical models
(models of phenomena). Theoretical models are viewed as conjectures about
(possible or actual) mechanisms (Ylikoski, Aydinonat 2014, Marchionni
2017). Rodrik (2015: 85) also accepts the view that theoretical models stand
for “the dominant causal mechanism or channels at work.” Considering that
mechanisms may screen off or multiply one another (Reiss 2007), single
theoretical (highly abstract and simplified) models of one mechanism do not
imply predictions that can be observed by means of econometrics (without
experimental closure). Such a view seems to be present also in Rodrik’s
(2015: 91ff.) discussion of models representing different parts of a car and
their causal relevance to explaining the car’s breakdown. In the economic
world, mechanisms operate without experimental closure and therefore in-
fluence each other’s results. The claims that (a) theoretical models represent
isolated mechanisms and (b) several economic mechanisms can operate at
the same time and place lead to the conclusion that causal claims derived
from theoretical models are true only within a model or under experimental
closure replicating a modeled mechanism. Given this, supporting theoretical
conjectures with econometric evidence of observational regularities implied
by theoretical models is fruitless (despite making sense in other Methodo-
logical frameworks).
Some economists seem to presuppose this philosophical position in their
research and use theoretical and non-empirical models as exclusive evidence
for a causal claim. Let me consider Zhou’s (2014) study concluding that
“[m]ultiproduct search can significantly influence firms’ pricing decisions”
(2014: 2918). The conclusion is put forward exclusively on the basis of a theo-
retical, axiomatic, and highly mathematized model that instantiates the
mainstream practice of economic modeling.
Zhou’s (2014) model is populated by two types of agents: companies
(retailers) that set prices on products and consumers that, depending on the
costs of search effects, choose a strategy of searching for cheapest products
on the market and aim at minimizing their expenditure on a set of goods ful-
filling their needs. The model is based on several assumptions specifying, for
example, that shopping is done in the market equilibrium, and products are
horizontally differentiated. As Zhou (2014: 2922) admits, some assumptions
(such as free recall and the presence of the economies of scale in search-
driven prices) are “simplifying” in nature, which can be understood as ideal-
ization in the standard philosophical literature (Mäki 1994). On the basis of
the theoretical model, Zhou (2014: 2932) concludes that “[i]t has been shown
that multiproduct search can significantly affect firms’ pricing decisions.”
Using the modal verb (“can”) indicates that Zhou refrains from claiming that
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his mechanistic model describes observable effects (i.e., that the represented
mechanism produces effects strong enough to be observable; other mecha-
nisms may operate and interfere with it). If so, then this model seems to be
an excellent example of the view that models are conjectures about possible
mechanisms. Such models isolate and idealize possible mechanisms operat-
ing in the real world without gathering evidence needed to move from the
possibility claim to the actuality claim.
Such a practice is in line with Rodrik’s (2015: 84) view on economics as a
library of models. In this framework, offering new theoretical models of a
possible mechanism instantiates horizontal progress — that is, helps econo-
mists explain new phenomena or widens the scope of possible explanations.
3. CHECKING FOR THE ACTUALITY OF THE MODELED MECHANISM
However, in order to conclude that a model is the model (in translation to
contemporary philosophical language: the model of an actual mechanism, cf.
Rodrik 2015: 6), one needs to provide evidence that such a mechanism is an
actual mechanism — that is, that it operates in the world. Here empirical re-
search enters economic practice. One of the ways to establish that a theoreti-
cal model represents a mechanism that operates in the world and produces a
causal relation is to reproduce the mechanism in an experimental setting.
That is a plausible interpretation of the aim of Bartling’s, Fehr’s, and
Schmidt’s (2012) research, which combines laboratory experiment with theo-
retical models. The economists define their purpose as follows: “to isolate the
causal forces that render one or the other bundle profit-maximizing and
compare them with the bundles the employers actually chose” (2012: 841). In
detail, their study focuses on two mechanisms (screening and competition)
that are conjectured in theoretical literature but, because of co-existence,
cannot be analyzed separately in observational data.
The first step of their research is to review the theoretical literature and
deduce predictions that would be true if the mechanisms represented by the
models of the labor market were true, taking into account the social prefer-
ences of agents. The second stage is to conduct a randomized laboratory ex-
periment of a labor market. The participants of the experiment could choose
the level of effort in response to several treatments (Bartling, Fehr, Schmidt
2012: 846ff.). The experimental closure controlled by economists makes it
possible to isolate the mechanism under investigation and establish plausible
causal claims about its operation. As the authors put it:
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[i]n most labor markets, competition and screening interact in intricate ways. Since
they almost always exist simultaneously, it is difficult to identify how competition
shapes employers’ screening activities and employees’ reputation-formation behavior
in field data. Our laboratory setting enables us to study this question cleanly by con-
ducting an additional treatment that . . . allows us to answer the question of whether
competition renders the control strategy or the trust strategy more efficient. (Bartling,
Fehr, Schmidt 2012: 855)
4. THEORETICAL MODELS AS ECONOMIC DESCRIPTIONS OF DATA
In contrast to scientific realism, which interprets models as representa-
tions, the pragmatist philosophy of science rejects the view that scientific
theories (and, in contemporary debates, models) can be true. Instead, prag-
matism emphasizes the practical implications of the products of scientific en-
deavor (James 1907, Hookway 2016). The pragmatist philosophy of science
entered economic methodology via a famous essay by Friedman (2008
[1953]), who argued that the assumptions of theoretical models that are un-
realistic (i.e., false) are acceptable if the model delivers accurate predictions.4
Despite several misinterpretations,5 The Methodology of Positive Economics
is now read as a text advising instrumentalist methodology (Mariyani-Squire
2017). According to Friedman’s instrumentalism interpreted as a view deriving
from pragmatism, economic theories should serve as economic descriptions
of observations. As Lawrence Boland puts it, Friedman is “only concerned
with the usefulness of the conclusions derived from any theory” (Boland 1979:
503, cf. also Wible 1984). Friedman (2008: 156-157) offers the following two
thought experiments. First, he appraises a theory that predicts the location of
all leaves on a tree on the basis of the assumption that leaves deliberately cal-
culate sun exposure and choose their location by solving the maximization
problem. Second, he considers a theory predicting the behavior of pool play-
                                                   
4 “Prediction,” used by Friedman in the broad sense of the term, refers to predicting
both future and past values of variables.
5 Friedman’s essay has been interpreted as supporting instrumentalism, Popperianism,
scientific realism, constructive empiricism, and radical constructivism. It seems that each
philosopher of economics attempts to read Friedman’s essay through the lens of her own
views. As Friedman (2009) himself admits, various interpretations result from inconsistencies
and the lack of clarity of his essay. While the text itself and, more widely, instrumentalism
in the philosophy and methodology of economics is a broad and philosophically interesting
topic (cf. Maziarz 2018b: 68-75), the discussion here, due to the purpose of this article, is
limited to a brief overview of this stance and to highlighting the main difference between
instrumentalism and scientific realism, as presented by the philosophers of economics.
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ers that uses mathematics and physics to calculate the appropriate place-
ments of sticks. Given that, as far as we know, leaves do not solve differential
equations, and the hits of pool players are based on intuition, these theories
are unrealistic (i.e., literally false). However, given that Friedman’s instru-
mentalism assesses theories in terms of the adequacy of their predictions
rather than the truth of their assumptions, these theories get things right to
the extent that their predictions are accurate.
An example of such methodology is the study of Jovanovic and Szentes
(2013). They analyze the market for venture capital. While they also offer
a theoretical model, their purpose is not to explain a phenomenon under con-
sideration (given the view that only a true explanans explains) but to propose
a theoretical model replicating an empirical dataset. Their study consists of two
parts. First, the economists develop a theoretical model describing a world
populated by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. The authors describe the
assumptions of the model as follows: “[a]ll agents are risk neutral and discount
the future at the rate r, which is equal to the risk-free interest rate at which
agents can save” (Jovanovic, Szentes 2013: 498). The model is based on ide-
alizing (unrealistic) assumptions. Two such assumptions are as follows. First,
the economists assume the risk-neutrality of agents, which obviously contra-
dicts the risk aversion observed in many studies (Eckel, Grossman 2008,
Holt, Laury 2005). Second, contrary to the evidence from financial markets
(Altman, Saunders 1997, Bansal, Coleman 1996), they allow their model-world
agents to borrow money at a risk-free interest rate.
In the second stage of their study, Jovanovic and Szentes analyze statisti-
cally observable data describing the American venture capital market and
compare the predictions of their model with these data. More specifically,
they consider income distribution, cost profile, cumulative net cash flow, suc-
cess hazard, survival function, termination hazard, mode of exit, payoffs, and
returns. Jovanovic and Szentes give a hint of the purpose of their theoretical
conjecture when they conclude that they “fit an equilibrium model to the
data” (2013: 526) and indicate that they “have omitted explanatory variables
that could help improve the fit” (2013: 525). With such statements, they admit
that their theoretical model serves to reproduce the empirical data describing
an actual market of venture capital investments and start-up companies — it
is not a conjecture as to the actual mechanism producing the observed phe-
nomenon.
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5. AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL AS CONFIRMATION OF A THEORY
The first modern school in philosophy of science was logical positivism.
Although philosophers no longer support this approach, it continues to influ-
ence economic methodology. One of the grounds for the presence of outdated
philosophical views in economy is the history of econometrics: the quantitative
techniques were developed at the time when logical positivism was a main-
stream position in the philosophy of science. The doctrine of confirmationism
was developed by the Vienna Circle philosophers (e.g., Carnap 1959), who fo-
cused on distinguishing between science and nonscience and put an emphasis
on empiricism. Logical positivism entered economic methodology through the
work of Terrence W. Hutchison (1938, 2000), who focused on some aspects
of the doctrine and highlighted quantification, measurement, and confirma-
tion of empirical hypotheses.
In the general philosophy of science, the logical-positivist doctrine was
replaced by the Popperian view that the scientific method consists in refuta-
tions and corroborations. Although the two positions are in disagreement
about their general approach to using evidence in science, logical positivism
and Popperian fallibilism are, to some extent, intermingled in the philosophy
of economics. A plausible explanation involves knowledge of how the Popperian
thought entered economic methodology. Mark Blaug’s (1992 [1980]) work
seems to blend the two doctrines. For example, Blaug’s discussion of case
studies in the second part of his book, where he studies cases of “theory testing”
by comparing them with observations, is based on a neutral observational
language, although Popper opposed it (Fuller 2004: 143). Another argument
for interpreting Blaug’s works as being jointly inspired by logical positivism
and fallibilism is the theory–observation distinction, which is visibly presup-
posed in Blaug’s view on the role of “facts” in theory testing (Blaug 1992: 24).
Furthermore, Popper never admits that a single case falsifying a theory
should lead to the theory’s rejection, whereas such an idea is present in
Blaug’s book. While the idea that theories (and, in the present-day debates,
models) should be “tested” is widespread among economists, the meaning of
this claim is tangled and seems to draw on a mix of the two doctrines.
An example of the view on the role of econometric evidence as providing
a test for the implications of theoretical modeling is the research of Beaudry,
Doms, and Lewis (2010) on the diffusion of personal computers as a new
technology. Similarly to the previous case, their study consists of two steps or,
to put it in another way, combines two types of evidence: a theoretical model
and econometric evidence. However, despite combining the same types of
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evidence as the paper analyzed above, the story offered in the article is differ-
ent. Namely, their paper can be read as an attempt to test empirically the
predictions (hypotheses) implied by a theoretical model of radical change
(technological revolution): as the authors admit, “[o]ur model generates sev-
eral specific predictions that can be evaluated using metropolitan area-level
data” (Beaudry, Doms, Lewis 2010: 990).
The model put forward by Beaudry, Doms, and Lewis (2010: 992ff.) is
populated by companies choosing between technologies to produce goods Y.
The companies operate on a perfectly competitive market, and the technolo-
gies require different inputs. Thus, the companies maximize their profit by (1)
comparing relative prices of inputs and (2) choosing the cheapest way of pro-
duction. Technological decisions of companies that, on the basis of assump-
tion 2, rely on the access to skilled labor, shape the diffusion of technology.
The two main predictions of the theoretical model are as follows. First,
“[a]reas with a low relative price (or high relative supply) of skill are pre-
dicted to adopt PCs most intensively.” Second, “the return to skill should be-
come temporarily insensitive to increases in supply” (Beaudry, Doms, Lewis
2010: 990). These predictions are then tested on a dataset covering 217 US
cities in the last two decades of the twentieth century — that is, in the period
when the PC innovation was spreading. These “predictions,” also referred to
as “propositions” (2010: 996), are deduced from the theoretical model.
To test the deduced hypotheses, the economists estimate a simple regres-
sion that describes the change in the output of a region between 1980 and
2000 as a function of output at the beginning of the period and a logarithm of
the wage gap between college and high school. Beaudry, Doms, and Lewis
(2010: 1008-1010) control for some other variables in other regressions. Hy-
pothesis testing proceeds by comparing the deductions from the theoretical
model with relevant parameters of econometric models. For instance, after
repeating the main hypothesis supported by the model (“a central prediction
. . . is that, during a technological transition, the return to skill should in-
crease the most where supply of skill is initially highest”), Beaudry, Doms,
and Lewis (2010: 215) interpret the results of econometric regressions: “. . .
we report OLS estimates without any additional controls in the full and 1940
samples. These estimates suggest that the return rose significantly faster in
initially more educated markets: a 10 percent increase in skills in 1980 . . . is
associated with a 0.7-percentage-point larger change in the return to college
in 1980-2000.”
Until this point, the story told in the article is in line with Popperian falsi-
ficationism. In fact, the authors discuss their actions as an “attempt to falsify”
(Beaudry, Doms, Lewis 2010: 1012) the predictions of the theoretical model.
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The situation changes when they observe that the basic econometric model
gives estimates that are in disagreement with the predictions of the theoreti-
cal model (2010: 1015-1016). Their response to this difficulty suggests that
their approach is confirmationist rather than falsificationist. In other words,
they conduct the econometric exercise with the aim of finding support for the
theoretical model and not “proving” its falsity. To wit, the authors admit that
the “endogeneity of skill mix should manifest itself in the form of different
coefficients on the two components [the 1940 level and the 1940-1980 change].
The estimated effects of both components are similar” (2010: 1016) and not
significantly different. In response to this observation being in disagreement
with the theoretical model, the economists estimate additional regressions to
find empirical support for the model — namely, they look for confirmation of
the theoretical model instead of its falsification, which gives a hint that they
presuppose a version of the logical-positivist philosophy of science although,
in some parts of their paper, pay lip service to the doctrine of falsificationism.
6. METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM IN ECONOMICS
Mainstream neoclassical economics has usually been interpreted as a meth-
odologically-unified project inspired by logical positivism (e.g., McCloskey
1998). Recently, Moneta and Russo (2014) and Rodrik (2015) have argued for
two notions of pluralism. On the one hand, evidential pluralism states that
economists combine different research methods to establish causal claims.
On the other, model pluralism looks for plurality within one research method
— that is, within theoretical, axiomatic modeling. Yet the examples of influ-
ential economic studies discussed above support “methodological pluralism”:
not only do economists offer different types of evidence for causal claims6 but
they also subscribe to different Methodologies. To put it differently, econo-
mists, as a group, interpret the same types of evidence (e.g., econometric
models, theoretical models) in different ways. In the philosophy of econom-
ics, a multitude of philosophical views coexist. In the general philosophy of
science, pragmatism, logical positivism, fallibilism, constructivism, critical
realism, and scientific realism are schools that have dominated philosophical
discussions in certain periods. In the methodological and philosophical dis-
cussions about economics, the different views on science (Maziarz 2018b) are
still present despite the recent dominance of the scientific realism. Given this,
                                                   
6 Observing the pluralism of evidence is plausible also if economists were methodo-
logical monists.
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the hypothesis that different methodological “schools” inspire economists to
take different approaches to doing research and interpreting results seems
plausible.
I need to make two points here. First, while mainstream economics can be
a methodologically pluralist science, it is possible that each economist (taken
separately) supports one philosophical stance and hence is a methodological
monist. It is quite probable considering that the contemporary advancement
of research methods requires specialization not only in one field but also in
a limited number of related research methods. Second, economists rarely
voice their philosophical views. Therefore, the approaches they accept can
only be grasped by studying their research practice and analyzing economic
texts. Philosophers and economists taking part in the methodological debate
seek to “translate” their preferred philosophical views on science into explicit
methodological guidance. Differing opinions on advisable research methods
and their justified interpretations should be most visible on the frontier of
science, where new causal claims are voiced and supported.
The analysis of the four case studies sheds light on the most notable dif-
ference in the presuppositions held by economists. Both the theoretical con-
jecture of Zhou (section 2) and Bartling’s, Fehr’s, and Schmidt’s experimental
test of a model of mechanism (section 3) seem to presuppose the view that
economic mechanisms do not produce observable regularities because of the
co-existence of several mechanisms operating in the social realm. Accepting
this view leads to refraining from econometric studies of observational data.
Furthermore, the economists’ discussion of mechanisms (theoretical conjec-
ture thereof in Zhou and creating a mechanism under experimental closure in
Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt) supports the claim that economists share the
standard philosophy-of-economics view that theoretical models are models of
mechanisms.
By contrast, the other two pieces of economic research (discussed in sec-
tions 4 and 5) reject this view and aim to establish theoretical models that
produce observable regularities. Jovanovic and Szentes (2013) and Beaudry,
Doms, and Lewis (2010) share the view that the purpose of theoretical mod-
els is to reproduce an observable pattern by means of econometrics. On this
basis, it is justifiable to conclude that they do not accept the mainstream view
on mechanisms. However, the two studies differ in terms of their interpreta-
tion of theoretical and empirical (econometric) evidence. Jovanovic and
Szentes (2013) take care to offer a theoretical model that produces accurate
predictions of data. Such an approach presupposes estimating an econometric
model beforehand. These economists do not account for the truth of their
model in terms of its being a model of an actual mechanism or in terms of
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a realistic character of assumptions. Instead, they focus exclusively on empirical
adequacy. This purpose of research is in accordance with the pragmatist
methodology and especially with its instrumentalist version as formulated by
Friedman (2008 [1953]). Beaudry, Doms, and Lewis (2010) indicate that
their aim is to test their theoretical model empirically. Their research can be
interpreted as confirmationist or falsificationist in character. In fact, the authors
pay lip service to both conflicting approaches. A possible explanation for this
is that Popper’s views on science have been popularized in economic meth-
odology by Blaug’s (1992 [1980]) work leaning to the neopositivist doctrine.
The normative claims present in Friedman’s (2008 [1953]) and Blaug’s
(1992 [1980]) work still have an impact on the shape of economic research.
While scientific realism does not offer directly applicable methodological ad-
vice, contemporary debates over the role of theoretical models and mecha-
nisms in the social sciences also seem to shape economists’ views on the
methodology of their discipline. Given that all the four studies belong to, and
are representative of, contemporary mainstream economics, it seems justified
that mainstream economics is a Methodologically pluralist discipline. The
case studies discussed here show that, as a group, economists accept different
philosophical views on science.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Economists rarely reveal their philosophical views on science. In this pa-
per, I have argued that mainstream economics is a methodologically pluralist
discipline. My analysis of four recent and influential economic publications
shows that economists use different research methods as evidence for causal
claims and also interpret the evidence supplied by the results in various ways.
The different interpretations can be plausibly explained by indicating that
economists, as a group, accept different philosophical views on science.
Causal claims put forward in the analyzed studies are justified by a theo-
retical model used either as exclusive evidence or in connection to a laboratory
experiment, and by joint evidence of theoretical and econometric models. The
first two case studies seem to presuppose the view that theoretical models are
models of (actual or possible) mechanisms. The last two studies employ
similar theoretical models but interpret their role differently: either as an
economic description of data or as a theoretical conjecture aimed at produc-
ing testable consequences in observable data. These views on the role of dif-
ferent evidence seem to correspond to different schools (paradigms) in eco-
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nomic methodology: scientific realism, instrumentalism, and falsificationism
(confirmationism). However, even though economists as a group seem to be
Methodological pluralists, it is likely that each economist, considered sepa-
rately, would present (rarely explicitly) methodological presuppositions be-
longing to only one of the methodological schools.
Finally, I should note that the latter two cases differ regarding the stories
told in the papers. The research methods used in both cases belong to the
standard repertoire of economics — that is, they involve theoretical and
highly abstract mathematical models and typical econometric models of data.
Shedding light on the actual commitments and research practices would re-
quire observing economists’ activities in their laboratories.
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